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1 Introduction
Theoretical analysis in economics typically refers to the market as if its def-
inition were self-evident. However, in antitrust cases much eﬀort is invested
in order to present a precise deﬁnition of the relevant market with respect to
both product dimensions and geographic dimensions. The implementation
of competition law always requires that the relevant market is deﬁned in a
systematic and careful way. In this study we will present an econometrically
founded analysis of how to deﬁne the relevant market with respect to pro-
duction and wholesale of electricity in the Nordic countries with an emphasis
on the geographical dimension. We will adopt a Finnish perspective on the
geographical extension of the relevant market. Is the relevant market na-
tional (Finnish) or does it incorporate additional price areas in Nord Pool?
In particular, is the relevant market perhaps so extensive so as to capture all
the price areas, Finland, Sweden, Norway 1, Norway 2, Norway 3, Denmark 1
and Denmark 2, in Nord Pool?1
In general, the standard approach in European competition law for how
to deﬁne the relevant market is to apply the SSNIP-test (“Small but Sig-
niﬁcant Non-transitory Increase in Price”). The SSNIP-test essentially asks
whether a customer would switch to a competitor if confronted with a small
but signiﬁcant non-transitory increase in price. Thereby the crucial question
when applying the SSNIP-test to Finland is to essentially ask the following:
Could a hypothetical ﬁrm with suﬃciently strong market power in Finland
proﬁtably impose a non-transitory 5-10 % price increase without being chal-
lenged by competition from non-Finnish producers, for example, from Nord
Pool producers located outside of Finland? In other words, would a buyer
switch to a non-Finnish supplier if a hypothetical Finnish monopolist would
impose a non-transitory 5-10 % price increase?
We initially restrict our analysis to the issue of whether Finland and
Sweden are part of the same relevant market for production and wholesale of
electricity. For the national Finnish market to deﬁne its own relevant market
the SSNIP-test requires a certain permanency or persistence if there is a
Finnish price increase. Is it likely that failures of imports from Sweden to
discipline such a price increase exhibit such a persistency and predictability
so as to qualify for the criterion of a non-transitory price increase in the
legal sense of the SSNIP-test? Of course, it is more demanding than this
to establish that Finland constitutes a separate national market. If we were
unable to establish that Finland and Sweden belong to the same relevant
1When presenting the data in subsection 4.1 we characterize these price areas more
precisely.
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market we would have to demonstrate that imports from no other countries
belonging to Nord Pool, from Russia or from Estonia would not substitute for
the Swedish imports when a bottleneck for imports from Sweden is realized.2
Such a substitution would seem likely unless it can be shown that bottlenecks
for the import from other Nordic countries, Russia and Estonia coincide
with bottlenecks for the imports from Sweden. Subsequently we extend our
analysis to the whole Nord Pool area for the time period 2001-2007.
From a strictly theoretical point of view the relevant geographic mar-
ket should be determined on the basis of estimates of cross elasticities of
demand across diﬀerent price areas as well as estimates on marginal costs.
However, such an approach typically imposes too severe data restrictions for
the purpose of antitrust implementation. For that reason the literature has
developed a number of empirical approaches to exploit time series proper-
ties of area-speciﬁc prices as the basis for the deﬁnition of the geographical
dimension of the relevant market. Prominent examples in this respect in-
clude Horowitz (1981), Slade (1986), Spiller and Huang (1986) and Uri and
Rifkin (1985). These empirical approaches capture the basic idea that arbi-
trage will prevent prices in diﬀerent price areas from moving independently
of each other if these price areas belong to the same relevant market (see,
Stigler and Sherwin (1985)).
Walls (1994) and Forni (2004) have econometrically interpreted the mar-
ket deﬁnition as implying cointegration between prices within the same mar-
ket. In this paper, we apply a similar cointegration approach to characterizing
market delineation within a more general system framework. This is particu-
larly valuable when there are more than two price areas, because potentially
conﬂicting results from mutually pairwise tests can be avoided. Furthermore,
our approach allows us to obtain a representation of the common stochastic
trends, which may be informative for understanding the mechanisms under-
lying common price movements (for example, access to hydro power). In
addition, we test weak (long-run) exogeneity in order to explore whether
the common stochastic trend originate in one particular area relative to the
others within the same relevant market.
The promotion of competition and eﬃciency in the European electricity
markets has been a strong policy priority for the European Commission. Op-
erational criteria for how to deﬁne a relevant market in a geographical sense
serve as a precondition for economic assessments of the electricity industry
no matter whether a merger case or a case focusing on potential abuse of
market dominance (Article 82) is evaluated. Thus, the operational criteria
2The design of Nord Pool implies that prices across areas are equalized if there are no
restrictions (bottlenecks) in transmission capacity between areas.
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for how to geographically deﬁne the relevant market servers as a crucial in-
strument of competition policy (see, for example, Vandezande et al. (2006)).
In its recent sector inquiry on the gas and electricity industries the Euro-
pean Commission (2007) presents a detailed discussion of the market for
production and wholesale of electricity in the Nordic countries. This sector
inquiry pays attention to the following factors as central when evaluating
whether Finland and Sweden form an integrated market. (i) The correlation
between the prices in Finland and Sweden. (ii) The similarity of Finnish and
Swedish prices of the contracts for diﬀerences (CfD’s) in the forward markets.
(iii) Nord Pool as an integrated market design for the Finnish and Swedish
electricity market. Relatedly, in the case Sydkraft/Graninge3 the European
Commission’s market analysis reaches the following conclusion regarding the
deﬁnition of the relevant geographic market: “. . . it is clear that Sweden has
only constituted a separate geographic area during an insigniﬁcant period
of time in each of the last years. At the same time the price correlation
between Sweden and Finland and Sweden and Denmark seems to imply that
the generation /wholesale market is likely to be larger than Sweden” (see, §
27 of the decision).
The geographical dimension of the relevant market for production and
wholesale of electricity has also been subject to decisions on the national
level in the Nordic countries. In a decision concerning Sweden and dated 7
May 2007 the Swedish Competition Authority concludes that the relevant
market for production and wholesale of electricity is Nordic or at least larger
than the national market. Contrary to this view, in its evaluation in year 2006
of the recent acquisition by Fortum Power and Heat Oy of E.ON Finland the
Finnish Competition Authority seemed to suggested an intertemporal sepa-
ration according to which the relevant market would be the national Finnish
market under the phase when there are bottlenecks for the transmission of
electricity between Finland and Sweden, whereas the relevant market would
include both countries when such bottlenecks are not binding. However, the
deﬁnition of the relevant market suggested by the Finnish Competition Au-
thority was rejected by the Finnish Market Court in its ruling dated 14 March
2008. According to the Market Court, the relevant geographical market area
consists of at least Finland and Sweden.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present our approach
for how to econometrically deﬁne the relevant market. The statistical model
is presented in Section 3. In Section 4 we apply cointegration analysis to
hourly Nord Pool prices during the period 2001-2007 in order to empirically
characterize the geographical dimension of the relevant market for production
3Case No COMP/M.3268 (30.10.2003).
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and wholesale of electricity. In Section 5 we evaluate the policy option of an
intertemporal separation in the deﬁnition of the relevant market. Section 6
concludes.
2 An Econometric Approach to Delineation of
Markets
Within a market operating under conditions with competition the demand
faced by one ﬁrm is dependent on the prices set by the other ﬁrms. This
interconnectivity of demands implies that exogenous shocks, even if they
are ﬁrm-speciﬁc, trigger price reactions among all ﬁrms in the market. In
other words, prices in the same market internalize the same set of shocks
and cannot, therefore, persistently deviate from (some) market equilibrium.
Such deviations can survive only as a temporary phenomenon.
This property implies a high degree of correlation between the prices in
areas belonging to the same relevant market. This high degree of correlation
can statistically be exploited to empirically characterize the relevant mar-
ket from observed price data. However, prices in separate markets can also
display a high degree of correlation due to, for instance, common exogenous
factors.4 Hence, a high degree of correlation between prices alone is not
in general suﬃcient to delineate markets unless such common factors have
been accounted for. In addition, there should be no signiﬁcant deterministic
deviations between prices.5
In a non-stationary price environment, the condition placed on the evolve-
ment of prices belonging to the same market is more stringent: The prices
must share the same stochastic trends in the same relative proportions, i.e.
they must be cointegrated. If they are not, arbitrarily large deviations be-
tween the prices are possible in the long-run, a feature which is not consis-
tent with equilibrium under conditions with interconnected demands. By
contrast, even in the unlikely case where prices in separate markets share
the same stochastic trends, there is no reason why the composition of these
trends should be proportional. Hence, prices in separate markets will in
general not be cointegrated. Thus, in the non-stationary case cointegration
between prices serves as a substitute for taking exogenous common factors
4For example, consider the price of ﬂight tickets and taxi fares in the face of an oil price
shock.
5There is no objective benchmark as to what constitutes a signiﬁcant deterministic
deviation with respect to market delineation. For example, in some cases a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in the mean of the prices may be suﬃcient for them to belong to separate
markets (e.g. homogeneous goods markets) while this may not be suﬃcient in other cases.
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into account.
Speciﬁcally, let pi;t be the price in area i and pj;t the price in area j. If
these areas deﬁne the same market in the sense above and prices are non-
stationary we can represent the prices according to
pi;t = ci
tX
h=1
"h + c
¤
i (L)"i;t
pj;t = cj
tX
h=1
"h + c
¤
j(L)"j;t
where
Pt
h=1 "h is the common stochastic trend,
6 "i;t and "j;t are area-speciﬁc
shocks, the parameters ci and cj are the loadings to this stochastic trend, and
the roots of the polynomials c¤i (z) and c¤j(z) are outside the unit circle. Thus,
the prices must be cointegrated with cointegration vector ¯ = (1; ¡ci=cj)0.
The requirement of cointegration does not, as such, imply that ci = cj. For
example, if the products are not perfect substitutes the loadings may very well
diﬀer. However, if the products are perfect substitutes the price areas deﬁne
the same market if ci = cj and hence the cointegration vector ¯ = (1; ¡1)0.
Walls (1994) applies precisely this approach when characterizing the relevant
geographical market for the U.S. natural gas industry.7 For this homogeneous
market he tests the more stringent pairwise condition that ci = cj to all
areas in his sample. Importantly, he also proposes a less stringent market
deﬁnition by testing j(ci=cj)¡ 1j · ±, for some ± ¸ 0. In this paper we
advocate the general view that cointegrated price series are a suﬃcient and
necessary condition for two areas to deﬁne the same market. The acceptable
deviation from unity in the proportion of the loadings is industry-speciﬁc and
determined by the degree of substitutability between the products in terms
of both the product characteristics and geographic barriers (for example,
transportation costs).
Thus, in the non-stationary case, the issue of market delineation for ho-
mogeneous goods can econometrically be decomposed into three separate
questions.
(i) Can we reject the hypothesis of cointegration between the prices, i.e.
is there evidence that the prices have deviated from equilibrium in a
long-run perspective?
6The common stochastic trend can be interpreted as an aggregate of several structural
stochastic trends that enter the prices proportionally, with the relative proportion ci=cj .
7Related conditions for both product and geographical market delineation are tested
in Horowitz (1981) and Forni (2004).
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(ii) Can we reject the hypothesis of long-run homogeneity in cointegrated
prices?
(iii) Are there signiﬁcant deterministic diﬀerences between the prices?
If the answer to any of these questions is aﬃrmative we must reject the
hypothesis that the ﬁrms belong to the same relevant market. If, on the
other hand, the answer to all questions is negative, we should conclude that
the ﬁrms belong to the same relevant market.
On a fundamental level competition policy, like microeconomic policy
more generally, targets structural market imperfections with long-run eﬀects.
Consistent with this general perspective the SSNIP-test speciﬁes that the rel-
evant market should be deﬁned based on the ability of a hypothetical ﬁrm
with suﬃciently strong market power to impose a price increase with a suf-
ﬁcient degree of permanency or persistence. The criterion of permanency or
persistence should reasonably be determined in light of the prevailing mode
of competition so as to match industry-speciﬁc factors like the required time
to observe rivals’ prices, to implement price responses, and possibly also to
conduct capacity adjustments. This means that the relevant market cannot
be too narrowly deﬁned in an intertemporal sense so as to capture individual
hours, minutes or seconds. Under all circumstances the time required for
unconstrained competition to discipline a price set above a level consistent
with competition deﬁnes a lower bound for the horizon, shorter than which
an intertemporal deﬁnition of the relevant market would not be meaningful.
Hence, the empirical condition that prices within a relevant market should
be cointegrated and homogeneous is consistent with the implications of be-
longing to the same market according to the SSNIP-test.
We can summarize our econometric procedure, whereby the relevant mar-
ket is deﬁned, in a logical sequence of steps. In the ﬁrst step we determine
whether the price series are stationary or not since the statistical inference
is crucially dependent on this property. If the prices are stationary and
signiﬁcantly correlated, we must control for possible common factors and in-
vestigate their relative deterministic diﬀerences in order to decide if the areas
belong to the same market. On the other hand, if prices are non-stationary,
mean reversion around their combined deterministic components can only
occur if they are cointegrated.8 Thus, only if the prices are cointegrated,
homogeneous and do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly with respect to their determin-
istic diﬀerences can we can conclude the ﬁrms belong to the same relevant
market. Figure 1 summarizes this procedure. We apply this procedure to
8In the intermediate case where one price is stationary while the other is not, there
cannot by deﬁnition be any mean reversion between the series. Thus, such a result would
6
Flow chart of the econometric procedure
Yes
same relevant market
Conclusion: the
relevant markets
Conclusion: separate
No
YesNo
Case 1: all prices
stationary non−stationary
Case 2: all prices
pricesgroups
Not homogenousHomogenous price
groups
within cointegrated
Test price homogeneity
cointegrated prices?
Are there groups of
rank test statistic and the order of integration
Estimate the prices by equation (2).
Significant deterministics?
Test the order of integration by the reduced
of the individual prices.
Figure 1: Flow chart of the econometric procedure.
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characterize the relevant market for production and wholesale of electricity
in the Nordic countries in Section 4.
3 The Statistical Model
The implementation of the econometric approach outlined in the previous
section requires a statistical framework that can be used to analyze the inte-
gration and cointegration properties of a vector of prices. A natural choice
is the vector auto-regressive (VAR) model in its error correcting form.
The p-dimensional VAR model with k lags is given by
Xt =
kX
i=1
AiXt¡k +ªDt + "t (1)
where Xt is a p-dimensional time series vector, Ai (i = 1; :::; k) and ª are
parameter matrices, Dt is a p £ f matrix that collects the deterministic
components, and "t » Np(0;§). In our application Xt will be a vector
of prices from areas that potentially belong to the same market. If Xt »
I(1) (integrated of the ﬁrst order) it is convenient to transform (1) into its
corresponding error correction form
¢Xt =
k¡1X
i=1
¡i¢Xt¡i +¦Xt¡1 +ªDt + "t (2)
where parameter matrices ¡i and ¦ are functions of the Ai matrices. The
properties of this model are extensively investigated in Johansen (1995).
Cointegration can be tested as a reduced rank hypothesis on the ¦matrix.
If the rank, r, of ¦ is equal to p we can conclude that Xt is stationary, i.e.
Xt » I(0). If 0 < r < p, then Xt » I(1) is cointegrated with r cointegration
vectors and p¡ r common stochastic trends. In this case, ¦ = ®¯0, where ®
and ¯ are two (p£ r) matrices of full column rank. The cointegration space
is spanned by ¯0. If r = 0 then Xt » I(1) and the process is not cointegrated.
An important special case of (2) is obtained when 0 < r < p and a
deterministic linear trend is restricted to the cointegration space. The reason
for restricting the linear trend is that (2) implies quadratic trends in Xt
otherwise. If the trend is restricted, ¦Xt¡1 in (2) can be written as ® ~¯0 ~Xt¡1,
where ~¯ = (¯0; ·)0, · is a r -dimensional vector, and ~Xt¡1 = (X 0t¡1; t)0.
The test for the reduced rank of ¦, known as the trace test, was developed
by Johansen (1991). The null hypothesis of the trace test is that the rank of
indicate that the price areas do not belong to the same relevant market.
8
¦ is less or equal to r. Hence, the natural testing sequence from a statistical
point of view is to start by testing r = 0 and then successively increasing the
rank by one until the ﬁrst non-rejection. The likelihood ratio test statistic
(trace test) of the hypothesis that the cointegration rank is r or less is given
by
¡2logQ(r) = ¡T
pX
i=r+1
log(1¡ ¸i) (3)
where ¸i are the eigenvalues of a reduced rank regression and T is the sample
size. Thus, the test will reject if the eigenvalues corresponding to the p ¡ r
common stochastic trends are statistically far from unity.
Given ¦ = ®¯ 0 , general linear hypotheses on ¯ can be tested in the form
H¯ : ¯ = (H1'1; :::; Hr'r) (4)
where Hi(p £ (p ¡mi)) imposes mi restrictions on ¯i, and 'i((p ¡mi) £ 1)
consists of p¡mi freely varying parameters. The likelihood ratio test of the
hypotheses is asymptotically Â2. Stationarity of an individual variable in Xt
can be tested by formulating Hi in such a way that one of the ¯-vectors is a
unit vector.
The ®-vectors can also be restricted in a similar way. Of special interest
is the case where one or several rows in ® consist of zeros. A variable with
a zero row in ® is said to be weakly exogenous. A weakly exogenous vari-
able generates a common stochastic trend and is not aﬀected by the other
stochastic trends in the system. In this sense, a weakly exogenous variable
can be viewed as a forcing variable in the long-run.
In our application it will sometimes be more convenient to obtain a rep-
resentation of the p¡ r common stochastic trends rather than the stationary
relations ¯ when p > 2. The reason is that the common trends represen-
tation contain the same statistical information as ® and ¯, but relieves us
from testing
¡
p
2
¢
cointegrating combinations between the prices. Instead, the
cointegrating combinations can be directly read from the common trends
representation.9 The inverse of (2), provided by the Granger-Johansen rep-
resentation theorem is
Xt = C
t¡1X
i=0
("t +ªDt) + C(L)("t +ªDt) +X0 (5)
where C = ¯?
³
®0?
³
I ¡Pk¡1i=1 ¡i´ ¯?´¡1 ®0?, C(L) is a stationary matrix
lag-polynomial with zeros outside the unit circle, X0 summarizes the initial
9However, cointegration tests can be utilized when the common trends representation
yields ambiguous results.
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condition, and ®? and ¯? denotes the orthogonal complements to ® and ¯.
The is the common trends representation of Xt. The matrix ®0? exhibits the
common stochastic trends, whereas ¯?
³
®0?
³
I ¡Pk¡1i=1 ¡i´ ¯?´¡1 provides
the loadings of the common stochastic trends into each element of Xt.
4 Application to Nord Pool price data
In this section we apply the econometric approach to price data from the
Nordic market for production and wholesale of electricity, Nord Pool. Within
Nord Pool wholesale prices of electricity are perfectly equalized among ﬁrms
within a given price area. Therefore, rather than considering the prices of
individual ﬁrms we investigate the relevant market delineation among Nordic
price areas instead. We begin by investigating if the price areas Finland and
Sweden belong to the same relevant market. We then extend the analysis to
cover all price areas of Nord Pool.
4.1 Data, Frequency and Aggregation
The data consists of hourly observations on prices from the following Nord
Pool price areas: Finland, Sweden, Norway 1, Norway 2, Norway 3, Den-
mark 1, and Denmark 2. In the terminology used by Nord Pool, Norway 1
refers to South-Norway (the Oslo area), Norway 2 to mid-Norway (the Trond-
heim area), Norway 3 to North-Norway (the Tromsö area), Denmark 1 to
East-Denmark (the Copenhagen area) and Denmark 2 to West-Denmark (the
Odense-area). Due to the almost complete correlation between Norway 2 and
Norway 3, we only consider Norway 3 in the analysis in order to avoid se-
vere multicollinearity problems.10 The price observations cover the period
2001:01:01:00-2007:12:31:23, which means that the sample consists of 61337
observations in total. Figures 2 and 3 depict the area-speciﬁc prices (ag-
gregated to a weekly frequency to facilitate the exposure). Table 1 presents
descriptive evidence on price convergence between Finnish and Swedish prices
during the period 2001-2007. The correlation coeﬃcient between Finnish and
Swedish prices exceeds 0.96 for all years except 2005 and 2006. The mean
of the price diﬀerence in the original hourly data, P FINt ¡ P SWEt , is -0.140
and the corresponding t-value is 5.71. Furthermore, the median of the price
diﬀerence is zero.
The large number of observations causes two particular econometric prob-
lems, one computational and the other statistical in nature. The ﬁrst problem
10Moreover, price data on Norway 2 is only available from 2003:07:23:00 onwards.
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Figure 2: Weekly price aggregates for Nord Pool price areas Finland, Sweden, and
Norway 3.
Finnish and Swedish Prices: Correlation and Price Diﬀerences
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005¤) 2006 2007
Corr(P FINt ; P
SWE
t ) 0.998 0.967 0.984 0.970 0.783 0.852 0.988
P FINt 22.84 27.27 35.30 27.68 30.53 48.57 30.01
P SWEt 22.86 27.61 36.49 28.08 29.76 48.12 30.26
P FINt ¡ P SWEt -0.02 -0.34 -1.18 -0.40 0.77 0.45 -0.25
Table 1: Finnish vs Swedish area prices (in Euro). *) A two hour price spike at 8.12.2005
which is fully due to Svenska Kraftnät’s operation is removed from the data.
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Figure 3: Weekly price aggregates for Nord Pool price areas Norway 1, Denmark 1 and
Denmark 2.
arises as the computational power of modern PCs is simply not suﬃcient to
calculate the trace test statistic for a well-speciﬁed model of the hourly data.
The second problem is that the large number of observations associated with
the hourly frequency increases the power of virtually all statistical tests (see
for example Otero and Smith (2000)). Of particular concern in this context
is that the increase in power associated with the hourly frequency would
tend to create a bias towards the conclusion that the price areas belong to
the same relevant market. In this study we are particularly concerned with
errors of type I, i.e. we want to avoid deﬁning the market too broadly. Fur-
thermore, with hourly observations it is diﬃcult to account for all exogenous
events that cause symmetric additive outliers in the price series. Such out-
liers can cause an additional bias towards cointegration or even stationarity
(see Bohn Nielsen (2004) and Franses and Haldrup (1994), among others).
From a statistical point of view temporal aggregation reduces the power
of the tests and makes the problem with outliers manageable. The reason
is that averaging over periods preserves the integration and cointegration
properties of the data while reducing the total sample size T (see Marcellino,
1999). Thus, we will mainly operate with daily aggregates of the price data
in this paper. However, we conduct robustness checks with both weekly and
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Figure 4: Hourly, Daily, Weekly, and Monthly aggregates of Finnish prices.
monthly frequencies. Moreover, to the extent that results are obtainable with
hourly observations these essentially coincide with the results based on daily
observations.
The number of observations for each price area at the daily frequency is
2556. Figure 4 shows Finnish area prices at diﬀerent frequencies of aggrega-
tion (hourly, daily, weekly and monthly). While the aggregation, of course,
reduces the short-term volatility, the long-run stochastic trend is invariant
to aggregation, as Figure 4 graphically supports.
4.2 Tests with Finnish and Swedish Prices
We begin by applying our procedure to Finnish and Swedish prices. Figure 5
presents a graphical exposition of the daily electricity prices (logarithms) in
Finland and Sweden for the period 2001-2007 as well as the homogeneous
price diﬀerence pFINt ¡ pSWEt . This ﬁgure shows a very high correlation
between the prices in Finland and Sweden. In fact, the correlation is so high
that for most of the time it is optically impossible to distinguish the Finnish
price from the Swedish price.
The (logs of) Finnish and Swedish prices, pFINt and pSWEt , are modeled
by (2), where a trend is restricted to the cointegration space. We add 6
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Figure 5: The homogeneous price diﬀerence between Finland and Sweden, and the price
levels.
centered seasonal dummies to account for daily seasonal variation within the
week and 11 centered seasonal dummies to account for monthly seasonal
variation within the year.
Initial modeling of the data, indicated that 32 additional dummy vari-
ables were needed to account for extreme exogenous events that aﬀect both
Finnish and Swedish prices symmetrically. These dummies do not reﬂect any
signiﬁcant price deviations between Finland and Sweden, but rather symmet-
ric exogenous shocks that cannot be accounted for by any reasonable choice
of lag length. Ignoring these outliers would lead to (i) misspeciﬁcation and
unreasonably many lags in the auto-regression, and (ii) distortions of the
trace test statistic which cause over-rejection of the null of any given rank r,
i.e. they essentially bias the results towards stationarity and would thereby
introduce a tendency of excessive acceptance of the hypothesis that Finland
and Sweden belong to the same relevant market. The initial analysis also
revealed a number of idiosyncratic shocks to either price series. These were
not blocked out by dummy variables.
The choice of lag-length, k, was based on the Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn
information criteria which indicated that between 4 and 7 lags were needed
in order to account for the variation in the data. We chose a lag structure
with 7 days to capture potential systematic patterns related to the time of
the week. However, any lag k above 4 days yields virtually identical results
as those reported below. It should also be noted that the seasonal dum-
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Reduced rank hypothesis, Xt = (pFINt ; pSWEt )0
Sample r = 0 r = 1
¸i Tr Tr95 p-val ¸i Tr Tr95 p-val
Full sample, 01-07 0.055 153.04 25.73 0.000 0.003 9.34 12.45 0.164
Half sample, 04-07 0.056 88.74 25.73 0.000 0.003 4.67 12.45 0.649
Year 01 0.098 56.17 25.73 0.000 0.052 19.09 12.45 0.003
Year 02 0.081 38.97 25.73 0.000 0.024 8.86 12.45 0.194
Year 03 0.097 58.92 25.73 0.000 0.061 22.49 12.45 0.001
Year 04 0.069 33.93 25.73 0.003 0.023 8.31 12.45 0.234
Year 05 0.097 50.48 25.73 0.000 0.038 13.97 12.45 0.026
Year 06 0.079 33.93 25.73 0.003 0.013 4.68 12.45 0.648
Year 07 0.061 31.00 25.73 0.009 0.024 8.56 12.45 0.215
Table 2: The reduced rank test statistic for daily Finnish and Swedish prices. In the
table, ¸i are the eigenvalues from the reduced rank regression, Tr is the trace test statistic,
Tr95 is the 95%-quantiles of the trace distribution, and p-val is the probability values
associated with the null hypothesis of the given rank in the columns. Bold values indicate
insigniﬁcant results at a 1% signiﬁcance level.
mies accounting for monthly variation were all insigniﬁcant, and therefore
excluded.
With these choices, we tested the model for long-run structural stability.11
There were some indications of a structural shift in the middle of year 2003.
For this reason, we consider both the full sample (2001-2007), and the latter
half of the sample (2004-2007). In addition, we consider each year separately
as a robustness check.12
4.2.1 Cointegration tests on Finnish and Swedish prices
Table 2 reports the rank test statistic for the diﬀerent samples. Since we
are worried about errors of type I, we choose to conduct the test at the
1% signiﬁcance level. Table 2 reveals that r = 0 is rejected in all samples
(although, in year 2007 we are close to non-rejection). Moreover, apart from
the relatively stable years 2001 and 2003, we cannot reject the null hypothesis
of r = 1. These results suggest that there is one common stochastic trend in
11The tests of structural include constancy tests for the coeﬃcient estimates of the iden-
tiﬁed cointegration space, constancy of the log-likelihood, and constancy of the canonical
correlations ¸i, among others. These tests are described in Hansen and Johansen (1999).
12It should be noted that a year is in general a very short period within which to
investigate the long-run properties of time series, i.e. integration and cointegration. Thus,
results may diﬀer to some extent from year to year.
15
Tests of stationarity, weak exogeneity, and trend exclusion
pFINt p
SWE
t t-excl
Sample Stat Exo Stat Exo
Full sample, 01-07 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:693 0:156
Half sample, 04-07 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:212 0:834
Year 01 0:000¤) 0:049¤) 0:000¤) 0:197¤) 0:945¤)
Year 02 0:000 0:278 0:000 0:136 0:589
Year 03 0:092¤) 0:000¤) 0:036¤) 0:007¤) 0:310¤)
Year 04 0:000 0:005 0:000 0:613 0:097
Year 05 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:626 0:025
Year 06 0:000 0:003 0:000 0:723 0:012
Year 07 0:000 0:071 0:000 0:430 0:991
Table 3: Test of stationarity and weak exogeneity of daily Finnish and Swedish prices
given r = 1. *) indicates that r = 1 was rejected in Table 2. The null hypotheses are
that of stationarity and weak exogeneity respectively. The table also reports the null of
trend exclusion (t-excl). The numbers are p-values of the null hypotheses. Not signiﬁcant
results at the 5% signiﬁcance level in bold.
the data and that at least one of the price series is non-stationary. Moreover,
if both prices are found to be non-stationary, these must be cointegrated as
well.
Table 3 reports the results from testing stationarity and weak exogeneity.
The table also reports the results from testing whether the linear trend in the
cointegration space can be excluded. As can be seen from Table 3, stationary
is rejected in both prices in the full and the half sample. This result implies
that Swedish and Finnish prices are cointegrated. Moreover, weak exogeneity
cannot be rejected in Swedish prices. Also, the linear trend can be excluded
indicating that there are no diﬀerences in the deterministic component. The
yearly results follow the same structure, with minor diﬀerences due to the
approximate stationarity in 2001 and 2003, and the near non-rejection of
r = 0 in 2007.
4.2.2 Test of price homogeneity
The previous sub-section established that Swedish and Finnish prices are
cointegrated. However, as discussed in Section 2, a more strict deﬁnition
of geographic market delineation for homogeneous goods also requires price
homogeneity, or at least approximate price homogeneity, in addition to coin-
tegration. Table 4 reports unrestricted estimates of the cointegration vectors
(with the linear trend excluded) and tests of price homogeneity. The table
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Unrestricted estimates and test of price homogeneity
Sample Unrestricted estimates test of pFIN
Â2(df) p-val
Full sample, 01-07 pFINt ¡ 0:97
(¡102:35)
¢ P SWE Â2(1) = 7:26 0.007
Half sample, 04-07 pFINt ¡ 0:99
(¡75:17)
¢ P SWE Â2(1) = 0:14 0.706
Year 01¤) pFINt ¡ 0:97
(¡137:65)
¢ P SWE Â2(1) = 7:21 0.007
Year 02 pFINt ¡ 0:90
(¡45:64)
¢ P SWE Â2(1) = 12:84 0.000
Year 03¤) pFINt ¡ 0:74
(¡15:77)
¢ P SWE Â2(1) = 8:99 0.003
Year 04 pFINt ¡ 0:89
(¡23:75)
¢ P SWE Â2(1) = 4:10 0.043
Year 05 pFINt ¡ 1:07
(¡17:69)
¢ P SWE Â2(1) = 0:73 0.391
Year 06 pFINt ¡ 0:96
(¡24:99)
¢ P SWE Â2(1) = 0:90 0.342
Year 07 pFINt ¡ 0:95
(¡76:65)
¢ P SWE Â2(1) = 9:39 0.002
Table 4: Unrestricted estimates of the cointegration vector between Finnish and Swedish
prices in each sample (the linear trend is excluded), given r = 1. *) indicates that r = 1 was
rejected in Table 2. The numbers in parenthesis are t-values. The last two columns test
homogeneity between the prices. Bold values indicate non-rejection at the 5% signiﬁcance
level.
reveals that there is a tendency for Swedish prices to be somewhat higher
than the Finnish prices. Furthermore, we note that price homogeneity can-
not be rejected in the half sample (2004-2007) and that the prices are never
far from homogeneity in any of the other samples.
4.2.3 Conclusions
Our econometric test, conducted in line with the procedure summarized in
Figure 1, justify the following conclusions.
1. Finnish and Swedish prices are integrated (of the ﬁrst order).
2. Finnish and Swedish prices are cointegrated and nearly homogeneous.
3. The deterministic linear trend in the price diﬀerence is insigniﬁcant.
Consequently, our econometric test supports the view that Finland and Swe-
den constitute the same relevant market for production and wholesale of
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electricity. Furthermore, Swedish prices are (long-run) weakly exogenous in-
dicating that in a structural sense the Swedish price area acts as a price
leader relative to the Finnish area. The Swedish prices tend to be somewhat
more volatile (in the long run) than the Finnish prices.
4.2.4 Robustness
We conducted the reduced rank test statistic on weekly (365 observations)
and monthly aggregates (84 observations). We consistently found that r = 0
was rejected, whereas r = 1 could not be rejected. Moreover, we found
that Swedish prices where weakly exogenous in the lower frequencies as well.
Overall, these results are consistent with the results associated with the daily
frequency.
We also obtained some results of interest for the hourly frequency. The
rank test statistic was not computationally available for a well-speciﬁed
model of the hourly data (including suﬃcient lags and dummies for sym-
metric outliers etc.). However, auxiliary information such as the roots of the
companion matrix and the t-values of the ®-matrix support r = 1 in the
hourly sample as well. Conditional on this choice of rank (r = 1), we again
found that Swedish prices were weakly exogenous with respect to Finnish
prices. In addition, we calculated the half-lives implied by the estimated
speed of the equilibrium adjustment of Finnish prices (ﬁrst ® coeﬃcient).
These indicated that an average equilibrium shock to the price diﬀerence
dissipates in slightly less than four hours. Overall, the results associated
with hourly data are consistent with the conclusions reported for daily data.
4.3 Is the Relevant Market More Extensive than Fin-
land and Sweden?
So far our analysis has been restricted to Finland and Sweden. However,
Nord Pool deﬁnes an integrated market design for a signiﬁcantly larger area
comprising price areas Norway 1, Norway 2, Norway 3, Denmark 1 and Den-
mark 2, in addition to Finland and Sweden. We now extend our analysis to
whole Nord Pool area.
On the Nord Pool level we report the results from the full sample (2001-
2007) and the latter half sample (2004-2007). We do not report individual
years, but emphasize that the yearly samples follow similar patterns. In ad-
dition, we also report the results from the full sample excluding the year
2007 (i.e. the sample 2001-2006). The reason is that the hydro reservoir
level in Norway 1 was close to the maximum level during 2007, thereby in-
ducing an extremely high supply of electricity generated by hydro power in
18
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Average 1990−2000 2007 
Figure 6: Norway 1 (South Norway) hydro reservoir content (% of full) in year 2007
compared with a historical average (1990-2000).
order to avoid wastes (see Figure 6). This production exceeded the export
transmission capacity of Norway 1, thereby leading, by necessity, to substan-
tially lower prices in Norway 1 compared to the other Nord Pool areas, in
particular during the latter half of 2007 (see Figure 7). It turns out that
the price deviation in 2007 was suﬃciently large and persistent to induce a
characterization of Norway 1 as a separate relevant market whenever 2007 is
in the sample, as is discussed below. Thus, by excluding 2007 from the full
sample we can assess the eﬀect of this particular year on the overall results.
As before, we label the logarithms of the prices in the diﬀerent areas as pFINt ,
pSWEt , pNOR1t , pNOR3t , pDK1t and pDK2t respectively.
On the Nord Pool level the prices were modeled by (2), where a trend
was included in the cointegration space and identical seasonal dummies were
added as before. In a similar fashion as before, 33 dummy variables were
added to account for extreme exogenous events that aﬀected at least two
or more areas symmetrically. As earlier, at least four lags were needed to
account for the variation in the data. Following our procedure for the analysis
of Finland and Sweden we selected the lag structure with k = 7.
19
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
−1
0
1
2 Difference of Finnish and Norwegian Area 1 Prices  
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
−1
0
1
2 Difference of Finnish and Norwegian Area 3 Prices 
Figure 7: The homogeneous price diﬀerence between Finland and Norway area 1 (upper
graph), and between Finland and Norway area 3 (lower graph).
4.3.1 Cointegration tests on Nord Pool prices
The reduced rank hypothesis is reported in Table 5. Table 5 indicates that the
rank in the full sample is ﬁve, independently of whether 2007 is excluded or
not. This implies that all non-stationary Nord Pool prices are cointegrated,
because they share the same stochastic trend. Hence, the non-stationary
area-speciﬁc prices cannot evolve independently of each other. In other words
these price areas impose competitive discipline on each other. The table also
shows that the rank is four in the half sample. Given that the area-speciﬁc
Reduced rank hypothesis, Xt = (pFINt ; pSWEt ; pNOR1t ; pNOR1t ; pDK1t ; pDK1t )0
r = 0 r = 1 r = 2 r = 3 r = 4 r = 5
Full sample, 01-07 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.47
Half sample, 04-07 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.187 0.734
Full sample, 01-06 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.682
Table 5: The reduced rank test statistic for Nord Pool prices. The numbers are p-values
of the null hypothesis of the ranks given in the columns. Not signiﬁcant results at the 1%
signiﬁcance level in bold.
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Tests of stationarity and weak exogeneity
Sample r Test pFINt pSWEt pNOR1t pNOR3t pDK1t pDK2t
Full sample, 01-07 5 Stat 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Exo 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.532 0.000 0.000
Half sample, 04-07 4 Stat 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Exo 0.000 0.000 0.197 0.316 0.000 0.000
Full sample, 01-06 5 Stat 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Exo 0.000 0.000 0.112 0.014 0.000 0.000
Table 6: Test of stationarity and weak exogeneity of daily Nord Pool prices given r = 1.
The null hypotheses are that of stationarity and weak exogeneity respectively and the
numbers are p-values of the null hypotheses. Not signiﬁcant results at the 5% signiﬁcance
level in bold.
prices are non-stationary, the case with a rank r = 4 would facilitate an
interpretation according to which Nord Pool can be decomposed into at least
two separate relevant markets. We demonstrate below that the additional
unit-root originates in the extreme conditions in Norway 1 during 2007.
Table 6 reports the results of testing stationarity and weak exogeneity on
all area-speciﬁc prices in the samples. Table 6 shows that stationarity can be
rejected for all area-speciﬁc prices, regardless of sample (the time horizon) or
choice of rank. Thus, for the full samples 2001-2007 and 2001-2006 the prices
in all Nord Pool areas are cointegrated. Furthermore, in the half sample the
Nord Pool area prices can potentially be divided into three groups according
to whether they exclusively share one of the two stochastic trends or whether
they contain both trends. Interestingly, pNOR3t is weakly exogenous in the full
sample when 2007 is included, whereas pNOR1t is weakly exogenous when 2007
is excluded. Both pNOR1t and pNOR3t are weakly exogenous is the half sample.
These results suggest that Norway 1 acts as the price leader under normal
conditions, like those prevailing when year 2007 is excluded. However, during
the abnormal year 2007, when the export transmission capacity of Norway 1
was exceeded, the role of price leader was taken over by Norway 3. Under all
circumstances, the two Norwegian areas serve as price leaders relative to all
other price areas in Nord Pool. Moreover, exclusion of the restricted linear
trend could not be rejected regardless of the sample or the choice of rank.
4.3.2 Tests of price homogeneity
The system approach adopted in this paper allows for simultaneous tests of
price homogeneity between two or more Nord Pool price areas. It seems
natural to begin by conducting pairwise tests and subsequently to extend
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Stochastic trends and their loadings
Full sample, 01-07 Half Sample, 04-07 Full sample, 01-06
r = 5 r = 4 r = 5Pt
i=1 "
NOR3
i
Pt
i=1 "
NOR3
i
Pt
i=1 "
NOR1
i
Pt
i=1 "
NOR1
i
pFINt 0:523
(4:250)
0:469
(6:568)
0:020
(0:793)
0:381
(4:969)
pSWEt 0:544
(4:250)
0:485
(6:709)
0:010
(0:388)
0:403
(4:969)
pNO1t 0:729
(4:250)
¡0:182
(¡1:243)
0:768
(14:530)
0:436
(4:969)
pNO3t 0:566
(4:250)
0:489
(6:487)
0:028
(1:027)
0413
(4:969)
pDK1t 0:335
(4:250)
0:221
(4:288)
0:116
(6:239)
0:191
(4:969)
pDK2t 0:489
(4:250)
0:381
(6:214)
0:039
(1:770)
0:355
(4:969)
Table 7: Loadings to the stochastic trends in the Norwegian prices. The numbers in
parenthesis are t-values.
the tests by successively adding more areas. Much eﬀort can be saved by
investigating the loadings of the common stochastic trends (see equation
(5)) prior to formally testing price homogeneity, since price pairs that are
very far from homogeneity are easily detected that way.
Given the weak exogeneity results we know that the common stochas-
tic trends, ®0?
Pt
i=1 "i, consist of the two Norwegian prices. Labeling these
as
Pt
i=1 "
NOR1
i and
Pt
i=1 "
NOR3
i respectively, Table 7 reports the loadings to
each trend. Table 7 reveals that, in the full sample 2001-2007, prices in the
Nord Pool areas Finland, Sweden, Norway 3 and Denmark 2 have similar
loadings. For instance the relative loading between Finland and Sweden is
cFIN=cSWE = 0:523=0:544 = 0:96 (see Section 2). Denmark 2 and Norway 3
have the smallest relative loading, cDK2=cNO3 = 0:85, which is rather far
from unity. Norway 1 and Denmark 1 each have signiﬁcantly diﬀerent load-
ings from the rest. Based on these observations, we only report the tests
of price homogeneity within the subset fpFINt ; pSWEt ; pNO3t ; pDK2t g.13 The
upper part of Table 8 reports pairwise tests of price homogeneity. As can
be seen from the table, none of the pairwise tests were rejected, although
some price pairs came close to rejection. The lower part of Table 8 reports
the test of price homogeneity between three or more prices within the subset
fpFINt ; pSWEt ; pNO3t ; pDK2t g. The only non-rejections occur for the subsets
fpFINt ; pNO3t ; pDK2t g and fpSWEt ; pNO3t ; pDK2t g. However, the other subsets of
13The homogeneity tests for other price pairs or groups were rejected. The detailed
results are available upon request.
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Tests of price homogeneity in the sample 2001-2007
Pairwise Tests
pFINt p
SWE
t p
NO3
t p
DK2
t
pFINt – Â2(1) = 6:43
(0:011)
Â2(1) = 6:31
(0:012)
Â2(1) = 3:09
(0:079)
pSWEt Â
2(1) = 6:43
(0:011)
– Â2(1) = 2:07
(0:150)
Â2(1) = 6:51
(0:011)
pNO3t Â
2(1) = 6:31
(0:012)
Â2(1) = 2:07
(0:150)
– Â2(1) = 6:62
(0:010)
pDK2t Â
2(1) = 3:09
(0:079)
Â2(1) = 6:51
(0:011)
Â2(1) = 6:62
(0:010)
–
Group Tests
fpFINt ; pSWEt ; pNO3t g Â2(2) = 10:10
(0:006)
fpFINt ; pSWEt ; pDK2t g Â2(2) = 10:92
(0:004)
fpFINt ; pNO3t ; pDK2t g Â2(2) = 8:84
(0:012)
fpSWEt ; pNO3t ; pDK2t g Â2(2) = 8:38
(0:015)
fpFINt ; pSWEt ; pNO3t ; pDK2t g Â2(3) =
(0:008)
11:86
Table 8: Tests of price homogeneity between Finland, Sweden, Norway 3 and Denmark 2
for the sample 2001-2007. The upper part of the table reports pairwise tests, whereas
the lower part reports tests between larger groups of price series. The test statistic is
distributed as Â2(df) and p-values are reported in parenthesis below the test statistic.
Bold numbers indicate non-rejection of price homogeneity at the 1% signiﬁcance level in
the respective price areas.
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Tests of price homogeneity in the sample 2001-2006
fpFINt ; pSWEt ; pNO1t g Â2(2) = 15:78
(0:000)
fpSWEt ; pNO3t ; pDK2t g Â2(2) = 6:86
(0:033)
fpFINt ; pSWEt ; pNO3t g Â2(2) = 7:31
(0:026)
fpNO1t ; pNO3t ; pDK2t g Â2(2) = 19:90
(0:000)
fpFINt ; pSWEt ; pDK2t g Â2(2) = 8:87
(0:012)
fpFINt ; pSWEt ; pNO1t ; pNO3t g Â2(3) = 19:19
(0:000)
fpFINt ; pNO1t ; pNO3t g Â2(2) = 18:19
(0:000)
fpFINt ; pSWEt ; pNO1t ; pDK2t g Â2(3) = 16:61
(0:001)
fpFINt ; pNO1t ; pDK2t g Â2(2) = 16:57
(0:000)
fpFINt ; pSWEt ; pNO3t ; pDK2t g Â2(3) = 9:03
(0:029)
fpFINt ; pNO3t ; pDK2t g Â2(2) = 6:98
(0:031)
fpFINt ; pNO1t ; pNO3t ; pDK2t g Â2(3) = 20:05
(0:000)
fpSWEt ; pNO1t ; pNO3t g Â2(2) = 14:79
(0:001)
fpSWEt ; pNO1t ; pNO3t ; pDK2t g Â2(3) = 20:32
(0:000)
fpSWEt ; pNO1t ; pDK2t g Â2(2) = 14:87
(0:001)
fpFINt ; pSWEt ; pNO1t ; pNO3t ; pDK2t g Â2(4) = 21:34
(0:000)
Table 9: Tests of price homogeneity between Finland, Sweden, Norway 1, Norway 3
and Denmark 2 for the sample 2001-2006. The test statistic is distributed as Â2(df) and
p-values are reported in parenthesis below the test statistic. Bold numbers indicate non-
rejection of price homogeneity at the 1% signiﬁcance level in the respective price areas.
prices were rejected by a very narrow margin at the 1% level of signiﬁcance.
Overall, we view this evidence as supportive of price homogeneity between
Finland, Sweden, Norway 3 and Denmark 2 in the full sample, 2001-2007.
For the half sample 2004-2007 the table reveals that Finland, Sweden and
Norway 3 share the same stochastic trend with similar loadings. Denmark 2
shares the same stochastic trend with these areas, but with signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent loading. The price in Norway 1 develops according to a separate
stochastic trend, whereas Denmark 1 shares both these stochastic trends.
These results suggest that Finland, Sweden, and Norway 3 possibly belong
to the same relevant market. The joint test of price homogeneity between
the prices in these areas generate Â2(2) = 7:37 and a p-value of 0.025, i.e.
a non-rejection of price homogeneity at the 1% signiﬁcance level. Thus, we
can draw the conclusion that Finland, Sweden and Norway 3 belong to the
same relevant market in the half sample.14
Finally, Table 7 reveals that the price in Denmark 1 has a signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent loading from other prices in the sample covering 2001-2006. Table 9
reports the results from testing price homogeneity in all groups of three or
more Nord Pool prices from the set fpFINt ; pSWEt ; pNO1t ; pNO3t ; pDK2t g. Inter-
14Pairwise test between these prices support this conclusion. Price homogeneity was
rejected for all combinations between pDK1t or pNO1t and other prices. These results are
available upon request.
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estingly, Table 9 reveals that price homogeneity cannot be rejected in any
such group which excludes the price in Norway 1. On the other hand, price
homogeneity is always rejected in all groups containing the price in Norway 1.
Thus, we have reasons to draw the conclusion that Nord Pool price areas Fin-
land, Sweden, Norway 3 and Denmark 2 belong to the same relevant market
in the sample 2001-2006.
In light of data there seems to be a strong relationship between Nord
Pool system prices and deviations of the Nordic (mostly Norwegian) hydro
reservoir levels compared with the norm of the year. More precisely, strong
reductions in the deviation of the reservoir level relative to norm seem to have
driven the visible incidents of price increases since 2001. Due to restrictions
in transmission capacity between price areas, this price eﬀect is stronger in
areas with a higher proportion of hydro generated power.15 This pattern
is clearly visible in Table 7, where the relative loadings to the stochastic
trends are highest for the Norwegian areas, followed successively by Sweden,
Finland, and Denmark. This also seems to explain the instances and patterns
of deviations from complete price homogeneity. Interestingly, these results
bear resemblance to the result obtained by Walls (1994) for the U.S. natural
gas industry.
4.3.3 Conclusions
Our econometric test on the whole Nord Pool level, conducted in line with
the procedure in Section 4.2, justify the following conclusions.16
1. All area-speciﬁc prices are non-stationary.
2. The area-speciﬁc prices are cointegrated with cointegration rank 5 in
the samples 2001-2007 and 2001-2006, whereas is cointegration rank is
4 in the sample 2004-2007.
3. During time horizons 2001-2007, as well as 2001-2006, the prices in the
Nord Pool areas Finland, Sweden, Norway 3, and Denmark 2 share the
same stochastic trends with the same loadings. We draw the unambigu-
ous conclusion that the Nord Pool areas Finland, Sweden Norway 3,
and Denmark 2 belong to the same relevant market during these peri-
ods.
15Hydro power constitutes 98% of the electricity capacity in Norway, 48% in Sweden,
18% in Finland, and 0% in Denmark at the end of 2006 (see Nordel annual report and
Nord Pool).
16As before, we conducted sensitivity analysis with respect to the reduced rank test
statistic on weekly and monthly frequencies. The results where similar to those obtained
on the daily frequency.
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4. Areas Norway 1 and Denmark 1 deﬁne separate markets on their own
during the periods 2001-2007 and 2001-2006.
5. During the time horizon 2004-2007 the prices areas Finland, Sweden,
and Norway 3 belong to the same relevant market. Areas Norway 1,
Denmark 1, and Denmark 2 deﬁne separate markets on their own.
6. There is a clear tendency that the price areas rich in hydro power serve
as price leaders relative to other areas in the same relevant market. Re-
strictions in international transmission capacity tend to generate higher
price volatility in these areas relative to the other areas. During normal
hydro power conditions (the period 2001-2006), the stochastic trend in
prices originates in price area Norway 1. However, if we include the
year 2007 this role is taken over by price area Norway 3.
Figure 8 depicts the decomposition of Nord Pool price areas into diﬀerent
relevant markets consistent with the econometric evidence. The ﬁgure also
illustrates the structure of the common stochastic trends in each sample.
This market decomposition is reported for the diﬀerent time horizons 2001-
2007, 2004-2007 or 2001-2006. The ﬁgure shows that Finland, Sweden, and
Norway 3, unambiguously belong to the same relevant market regardless of
the time horizon. Denmark 2 belongs to this same market in the samples
2001-2007 and 2001-2006, but deﬁnes its own market in the sample 2004-
2007. Norway 1 and Denmark 1 always deﬁne their own separate markets.
5 Bottlenecks in the Transmission Capacity be-
tween Finland and Sweden
We now return to a detailed investigation of bottlenecks in the transmission
capacity between Finland and Sweden. During a small proportion of hours
with price diﬀerences the international transmission capacity has been insuf-
ﬁcient to induce price equalization between Finland and Sweden. Figure 5
presents a graphical representation of the frequency by which such price dif-
ferences are realized. We refer to such states of nature simply as bottlenecks.
Table 10 presents a descriptive yearly account of the number and proportion
of hours when there has been a bottleneck in the international transmis-
sion capacity between Finland and Sweden. We can observe that during the
period 2001-2007 there has been a price diﬀerence between Finland and Swe-
den during 11,47 % of the hours. When there has been a bottleneck in the
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Figure 8: Nord Pool market delineation and structure of the common stochastic trends
based on the results from diﬀerent samples.
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Bottleneck Statistics (hours)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2001-2007
#fPFINt > PSWEt g 30 262 0 0 739 227 44 1301
#fPFINt < PSWEt g 66 177 2561 2092 77 375 385 5733
#fPFINt 6= PSWEt g 96 439 2561 2092 816 602 429 7035
#fPFINt = PSWEt g 8663 8320 6198 6691 7943 8157 8330 54302
T 8759 8759 8759 8783 8759 8759 8759 61337
#fPFINt >PSWEt g
T 0.34% 2.99% 0.00% 0.00% 8.44% 2.59% 0.50% 2.12%
#fPFINt <PSWEt g
T 0.75% 2.02% 29.24% 23.82% 0.88% 4.28% 4.40% 9.35%
#fPFINt 6=PSWEt g
T 1.09% 5.01% 29.24% 23.82% 9.32% 6.87% 4.90% 11.47%
#fPFINt =PSWEt g
T 98.91% 94.99% 70.76% 76.18% 90.68% 93.13% 95.10% 88.53%
Table 10: Bottleneck statistics between Finland and Sweden. #f¢g denotes the number
of the set and T is the total sample size.
transmission capacity between Finland and Sweden the price diﬀerence has
predominantly, during 9,35 % of the hours, been to the advantage of buyers
in the Finnish market.
With a deﬁnition of the relevant market as national it would, from a
theoretical point of view, be logically inconsistent to refer to structural com-
petition problems during phases of bottlenecks in the transmission of elec-
tricity between Finland and Sweden. The presence of bottlenecks in the
transmission of electricity between Finland and Sweden is an issue, which
is, in principle, unrelated to whether the Finnish market performs well as
a national market given the constraints imposed by the Finnish production
technology. Bottlenecks in the transmission of electricity between Finland
and Sweden constrain the ability to eﬃciently exploit the joint supply in the
two countries, but this does not imply any type of abuse of market power or
any other types of strategically induced distortions in the Finnish national
market. Such bottlenecks just mean that consumers are restricted to the
national sources available for electricity generation, and these might not al-
ways be able to match the eﬃciency of the sources available in the other
country. By logical necessity arguments identifying the bottlenecks of elec-
tricity transmission between Finland and Sweden as the core of potential
structural competition problems imply that the underlying relevant market
is larger than the Finnish national market and incorporate at least Finland
and Sweden. This inconsistency could potentially be reconciled by introduc-
ing an intertemporal separation of the relevant market into two phases: the
phase when there is no congestion for the transmission of electricity between
Finland and Sweden and the phase when there is congestion of intercon-
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nections between these countries.17 In most markets such an intertemporal
separation could not easily be conducted, but the remarkable transparency
of the Nord Pool market for electricity with prices determined regularly and
with high frequency, i.e. every hour, might at least theoretically make such
an intertemporal separation possible. Apparently, the idea behind such an
intertemporal separation could then be that the behavior of a potentially
dominant ﬁrm in Finland would not be constrained by the competitive dy-
namics of the Swedish market during those hours when there is congestion
of interconnections.
When evaluating the existing bottleneck statistics the crucial question
is the following: Has the incidence of the fairly infrequent bottlenecks had
any signiﬁcant price eﬀects? In light of the cointegration analysis conducted
in the previous section we can conclude that the incidence of infrequent
bottlenecks has induced no such persistent price eﬀects so as to justify a
view of Finland and Sweden as deﬁning separate relevant markets. On the
contrary, the cointegration analysis generated evidence in strong support of
Finland and Sweden belonging to the same relevant market even though our
econometric model was designed so as to create a bias in favor of the inference
supporting separate relevant markets.
Based on hourly area-speciﬁc prices one can draw some further descriptive
conclusions regarding the nature of the bottlenecks. The duration of bottle-
necks has predominantly been very short, typically one hour or at most a few
consecutive hours. There is no signiﬁcant relationship between the hour of
the day or the weekday and the incidence of a bottleneck. Furthermore, there
is no evidence that the bottlenecks would occur more frequently during the
winter months with the yearly regular peak in demand. As a matter of fact, if
the winter period is deﬁned as December-March the average frequency of bot-
tlenecks is 0,7 % (9,9 %) during the winter months 2001-2005 in association
with those bottlenecks when the Finnish (Swedish) price exceeds the Swedish
(Finnish) price.18 Thus, available data does not support the view with bot-
tlenecks emerging as a demand-driven phenomenon. Instead the variations in
hydro inﬂow and the complexity associated with the intertemporal reservoir
management together with other stochastic disturbances in the power gener-
ation seem to be the primary explanations for the emergence of bottlenecks.
Overall, in light of the detailed bottleneck statistics it does not seem credible
that the states with bottlenecks emerge in a way which is predictable to the
17As pointed out in our introduction, such an intertemporal separation has been sug-
gested by the Finnish Competition Authority.
18This should be compared with the yearly frequency of of bottlenecks reported in
Table 10. The average frequency of bottlenecks with the Finnish (Swedish) price exceeding
the Swedish (Finnish) price during 2001-2005 was 2,3 % (11,3 %).
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market participants. Furthermore, these states are typically not of such a
duration so as to have antitrust implications.
An intertemporal separation in the deﬁnition of the relevant market would
have far-reaching consequences for the implementation of competition law
and for competition policy more generally. The same argument in support
of an intertemporal separation of the deﬁnition of the relevant market could
then be applied in all markets characterized by the combination of demand
ﬂuctuations and capacity constraints. Such a policy would easily give incen-
tives for ﬁrms to establish excess capacity so as to avoid the risk of being
accused of abusing a dominant position in a phase where a bottleneck is re-
alized, i.e. a phase where demand exceeds the available capacity. For that
reason such a competition policy would induce distortions with excess ca-
pacity and thereby not promote eﬃcient investments. In this respect such
an intertemporal separation of the electricity market into an hour-by-hour
market would most likely counteract the overall goal of competition policy
as a structural microeconomic policy tool with the objective of promoting
eﬃciency in the long run.
6 Concluding Comments
In this study we applied cointegration analysis to daily aggregates of hourly
price observations during the period 2001-2007 in the Nord Pool price areas
with the objective of empirically characterizing the geographical dimension of
the relevant market for production and wholesale of electricity in the Nordic
countries. We initially established econometrically that Finland and Swe-
den belong to the same relevant market by demonstrating that Finnish and
Swedish area prices are cointegrated and homogeneous. We subsequently ex-
tended our analysis to the whole Nord Pool area and were able to establish
econometrically that the price areas Finland, Sweden and Norway 3 unam-
biguously belong to the same relevant market. Furthermore, we found that
the price area Denmark 2 belongs to this same market when evaluated over
the periods 2001-2007 or 2001-2006, but deﬁnes its own market over the pe-
riod 2004-2007. Norway 1 and Denmark 1 deﬁne separate relevant markets
on their own for each of the time periods studied. We also found a clear
tendency that the price areas rich in hydro power serve as price leaders rela-
tive to other areas in the same relevant market. During normal hydro power
conditions (the period 2001-2006), the stochastic trend in prices originates in
price area Norway 1. However, if we include the year 2007 this role is taken
over by price area Norway 3.
We presented detailed hourly statistics of bottlenecks in the international
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transmission capacity between Finland and Sweden in order to evaluate the
competition policy option of an intertemporal separation in the deﬁnition of
the relevant market into two phases depending on whether restrictions in the
international transmission capacity prevents the operation of competition.
We argued that such an intertemporal separation of the electricity market
into an hour-by-hour market would most likely counteract the overall goal
of competition policy as a structural microeconomic policy tool with the ob-
jective of promoting eﬃciency in the long run. And, under all circumstances
in light of the econometric evidence such an intertemporal separation of the
relevant markets is not consistent with the persistency requirements imposed
by the SSNIP-test.
The frequency for the emergence of bottlenecks in the transmission of
electricity between countries is largely determined by the capacity of inter-
connections between these countries. A proper structural assessment of the
relevant market should not be restricted to past and present market perfor-
mance, but it should also take the likely and foreseeable future development
of the relevant industry into account. In particular, the signiﬁcance of the
problem with bottlenecks should also be evaluated in light of existing com-
mitments and plans for future capacity expansions of the interconnections
between countries.
The transmission system operators in the Nordic countries (Denmark,
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) manage and coordinate the invest-
ments into capacity of transmission of electricity between the Nordic coun-
tries within the framework of NORDEL. The export capacity from Sweden to
other Nordic countries is in total 8010 MW, out of which 2230 MW towards
Finland. Similarly, the interconnection capacity from Finland to other Nordic
countries is 1930 MW, out of which 1830 MW is an export connection to Swe-
den. The total export and import capacities for Sweden are fairly equal, 9210
MW and 9470 MW, respectively. For Finland the total existing capacity for
import, 4240 MW, substantially exceeds the capacity for export, 2280 MW.
Furthermore, total Nordic capacity for imports from other countries (Russia,
Estonia, Poland and Germany) is 4710 MW, whereas the interconnection ca-
pacity for Nordic electricity export to the same non-Nordic countries is 3550
MW. In light of these capacities together with planned investments to further
improve the interconnections between national markets we can conclude that
eﬀort is made in order to control the incidence of bottlenecks. Borenstein
et al. (2000) present an interesting and relevant theoretical analysis, designed
primarily with the Californian market in mind, of the transmission capacity
necessary for two local markets to achieve the beneﬁts of competition within
the framework of an integrated market. It is also an overall goal of European
energy policy to promote an expansion of international interconnections in
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order to support a development in a direction towards the development with
the ultimate goal of creating a European market for production and whole-
sale of electricity. Of course, the likely transformation towards a uniﬁed
European market for production and wholesale of electricity will successively
enlarge the relevant market towards a European level.
Discussions of international interconnection capacity are easily biased to-
wards a view according to which higher interconnection capacity always gen-
erates beneﬁts. However, it should be kept in mind that it is not socially
optimal to establish such an extensive interconnection capacity that the prob-
ability for the emergence of a bottleneck would be reduced to zero. As al-
ways, the socially optimal capacity is determined by the condition that the
expected marginal social beneﬁt of an additional incremental unit of capac-
ity is equal to its marginal social cost. Our characterization of the relevant
markets within the framework of Nord Pool identiﬁes those price areas for
which an extended transmission capacity might have particularly high bene-
ﬁts. From an overall Nordic perspective high export transmission capacities
from Norway seem particularly valuable in light of our study.
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